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BOOK REVIEW
POSNER'S OVERCOMING LAW: "MUDDLING
THROUGH" THE HARD CASES'
Peter Blurnt
One of the many illustrations Richard Posner uses in
Overcoming Law' is a story familiar to first-year law students.
About 100 years ago, lawyers began searching for an
appropriate system of property rights in petroleum, a new
natural resource. At that time, there was a well-developed
body of law holding that there were no nonpossessory rights in
wild animals. Lawyers drew an analogy to this body of law in
dealing with petroleum, because petroleum, like wild animals,
was a nonstationary natural resource. Accordingly, just as with
rabbits and foxes, the courts decided that there were no
nonpossessory rights in petroleum.'
Thus the issue of property rights in petroleum was treated
"as one internal to legal materials, an issue of the relations
between legal concepts."3 Whether the rule formulated was the
most efficient or socially apt rule played no part in the
analysis; those best equipped to make such a judg-
ment-petroleum engineers, ecologists, and economists-were
not asked for their opinions.4 Indeed, the no-nonpossessory-
rights rule was quite inefficient: it impaired incentives to
* © 1995 Peter Blum. All Rights Reserved.
t Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid Society, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York,
NY. J-D., Brooklyn Law School, 1993; BA., Dickinson College, 1986.
RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
2 Id. at 399, 519-21; see also Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,
75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Ky. 1934); Westmoreland & Cambria Natl Gas Co. v. De
Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
3 POSNER, supra note 1, at 519.
' POSNER, supra note 1, at 399, 519.
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conserve a valuable resource, presenting the danger that
petroleum could be prematurely depleted in a race to extract it
from the ground.'
According to Posner, the sort of wooden legal reasoning
used in the early petroleum cases is alive and well today,
although perhaps better camouflaged. In Overcoming Law,
Posner makes a largely successful argument against the view
that difficult legal questions can be answered by examining the
relationship between legal concepts. Rather than ask the
traditional question of whether a legal rule can be derived
from an authoritative source, Posner posits that lawyers
should be more concerned with whether the rule makes sense
as a matter of social policy. To make this judgment, lawyers
must have a grasp of the consequences of different courses of
action, a grasp that can only be attained through empirical and
scientific inquiry. In Posner's view, economics, "the
instrumental science par excellence," is indispensable in this
inquiry.
A SUMMARY OF POSNER'S APPROACH: PRAGMATISM, ECONOMICS
AND LIBERALISM
Many chapters of Overcoming Law originated in earlier
writings,' and it shows; the chapters sprawl. However, while
the book does sometimes have the feel of a collection, there is
an underlying theme, summarized in Posner's Introduction,
that more or less links the chapters together. In the Introduc-
tion Posner states:
[Miost lawyers, judges, and law professors still believe that demon-
strably correct rather than merely plausible or reasonable answers
to most legal questions, even very difficult and contentious ones, can
be found-and it is imperative that they be found-by reasoning
from authoritative texts, either legislative enactments (including
constitutions) or judicial decisions, and therefore without recourse to
the theories, data, insights, or empirical methods of the social sci-
ences, or to personal or political values: without, in other words, an
encounter, necessarily messy, with the worlds of fact and feeling.'
POSNER, supra note 1, at 520.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 15.
POSNER, supra note 1, at vii-x.
' POSNER, supra note 1, at 20 (citation omitted).
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Posner's prescription is that lawyers take a more prag-
matic approach to the law. He defines pragmatism as "an ap-
proach that is practical and instrumental rather than
essentialist-interested in what works and what is useful rath-
er than in what 'really' is."9 A pragmatist is empirical, con-
cerned with the facts and the probable consequences of alter-
native courses of action. At the same time, the pragmatist is
skeptical of reaching the final truth about anything, and real-
izes that our certitudes are often nothing more than the tran-
sient beliefs of the community to which we belong. Posner's
brand of pragmatism, however, refuses to accept skepticism
and relativism as dogma; even while acknowledging that our
deeply held beliefs may be overthrown, Posner maintains that
a person must act on the assumption that some propositions
are more sound than others. 10
Being antidogmatic, Posner's pragmatist believes in debate
and free inquiry, especially scientific inquiry. Scientists can
expose falsehoods by generating hypotheses and testing them
through experimentation. Thus, scientists can help us under-
stand and control our natural and social environment; useful
knowledge can grow even if "truth" remains beyond our reach.
Indeed, experience, which is paramount to the pragmatist, has
shown that societies which slight the scientific method suffer
consequences such as high levels of poverty and illness."
Emphasizing the practical and useful, Posner doubts the
efficacy of analytic philosophy and traditional legal reasoning
in ordering society. Both fields overemphasize the logical ma-
nipulation of concepts and underemphasize the importance of
empirical support for one's views. Rather than allowing legal
rules to expand to their semantic limits without regard to
observable facts, Posner feels that lawyers should view legal
rules in instrumental terms. 12 He agrees with Cardozo's apho-
rism: 'The final cause of law is the welfare of society. " "
Because law is instrumental, Posner's pragmatist finds it
'POSNER, supra note 1, at 4.
" POsNER, supra note 1, at 5-6.
U POSNER, supra note 1, at 6-8, 390-91, 396.
12 PosNER, supra note 1, at 8-9, 391, 399, 446-47 & 466-67.
"PoSNER, supra note 1, at 391 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF TE JuDicIAL PROCESS 66 (1921)).
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strange to talk of immutable rights, moral obligations, and
reverence for the past-the currency of traditional legal rea-
soning. For example, as to stare decisis, the pragmatist "is apt
to think it as odd to suppose that ... a modern scientist has
an obligation to maintain a fit between what he does and what
Archimedes and Aristotle did."14 Not that the pragmatist has
anything against stare decisis and judicial conservatism per se;
there may be sound practical reasons why a judge should ad-
here to precedent and maintain a low profile. Posner main-
tains, however, that whatever one's judicial philosophy, it
should be justifiable on pragmatic grounds. 5
To Posner, the most useful tool for the pragmatic lawyer is
modern economics. "Modern" economists do not limit them-
selves to analyzing business firms, markets for goods and ser-
vices, and the like, but treat economics as an approach that
can be used to analyze nonmarket behavior in fields as diverse
as education, politics, health, family, and, of course, law. For
Posner, it is natural for economic methods to be applied to the
law: law controls human behavior, and economics constructs
and tests models to predict and control that behavior. 6
There are, however, essential aspects of the law that are
inherently unpragmatic and uneconomic. In "easy" cases-
-those cases where clearly established rules control-a judge
must adhere to the rules whether or not they comport with
economic theory." Even in novel cases, where the use of eco-
nomic methods is most legitimate, the judge may be faced with
issues that resist economic analysis. The abortion question is a
perfect example of this latter problem. According to Posner,
while the costs to the mother of bearing an unwanted child can
be measured using economic methods, whether the costs to the
fetus of being aborted "shall be counted at all depends on
whether fetuses are part of the community whose welfare is to
be maximized," and this question "cannot be answered within
economics.""8
To fill some of the gaps left by economic analysis, Posner
POSNER, supra note 1, at 11.
15 POSNER, supra note 1, at 5, 11-12, 400-03.
1' POSNER, supra note 1, at 15-16, 421-25.
" POSNER, supra note 1, at 21.
,' POSNER, supra note 1, at 22.
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turns to the liberalism of John Stuart Miil." Like Mill,
Posner argues that "every person is entitled to the maximum
liberty-both personal and economic-consistent with the liber-
ty of every other person in the society."2 People should be
free to engage in "self-regarding" behavior, "that is, behavior
that does not palpably harm other people."' Stated differ-
ently, what Posner calls "mental externalities" are not an ade-
quate basis to suppress conduct.' Therefore, that some people
are horrified by the self-regarding behavior of homosexuals is
not an adequate basis to discriminate against them.?
Posner argues that a pragmatic case can be made for liber-
alism. Societies which adhere most closely to liberal tenets, ac-
cording to Posner, have produced and are likely to produce
better consequences than those societies embracing socialism,
social democracy, moral conservatism, or fascism.24 Further-
more, liberalism and pragmatism mesh together neatly: "Liber-
alism... is the political philosophy best suited for societies in
which people don't agree on the foundations of morality, and
pragmatism is the philosophy of living without foundations."'
Unfortunately, although liberalism can fill gaps left by
economic theory, it is no better than economics in dealing with
some issues. Abortion is again the perfect example, because
the issue of whether abortion is self-regarding depends on
whether the fetus is a member of the community." Consider-
ation of especially tough issues like abortion forces Posner to
admit that his liberal-pragmatic "approach works well only
when there is at least modest agreement on ends," and that
"there are areas of discourse where a lack of common ends
precludes rational resolution. 7 Therefore, the value of prag-
matism sometimes "lies in preventing the premature closure of
issues rather than in actually resolving them.' Posner's
counsel to the legal system in these most difficult cases is to
See JOHN S. MIL., ON LIBERTY (1859).
POSNER, supra note 1, at 23.
21 POSNER, supra note 1, at 24.
1 POSNER, supra note 1, at 24.
3 POSNER, supra note 1, at 23, 27.
' POSNER, supra note 1, at 27, 29.
2' POSNER, supra note 1, at 29 (citations omitted).
POSNER, supra note 1, at 27.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 404.
" POSNER, supra note 1, at 397.
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"muddle through." 9
Posner is careful in Overcoming Law to note that pragma-
tism has "no inherent political valence."' In line with this
statement, Posner criticizes the unpragmatic reasoning of
commentators on both the political left and right. Although
Posner is certainly not shy about giving his own conservative
and libertarian opinions on specific questions of policy, he often
downplays his own opinions, qualifies them, or blurts them out
without a real attempt to support them. For example, he
criticizes Drucilla Cornell's "ethical argument" (her description)
in favor of employment tenure, which she bases on a reading of
Hegel.3 Posner defends employment at will on economic
grounds, taking the position that just-cause protection would
lead to high unemployment.32 He concludes his analysis, how-
ever, by deemphasizing his opinion ("I shall not pretend that
all economists would accept the analysis that I have presented
..... ") and stating that he objects to Cornell's argument only
because she has substituted political theory for the study of
consequences.33 Thus, while sometimes jarring, Posner's prac-
tice of stating and then downplaying his opinions is consistent
with his goal of exposing and refuting traditional methods of
legal analysis; he is not as interested, at least in this book, in
advocating specific policy outcomes.'
POSNER, supra note 1, at 404.
" POSNER, supra note 1, at 393.
" POSNER, supra note 1, at 299-311; Drucilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and
the Critique of Employment at Will, 10 CARDoZO L. REV. 1575, 1576 (1989).
32 POSNER, supra note 1, at 309-11.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 311.
3' Another example of how Posner handles his own opinions is provided by his
commentary on the political writings of philosopher Richard Rorty. Posner writes:
It is not clear, for example, that rich nations exploit poor ones, that
either the federal budget deficit or Japanese competition is a truly grave
problem for the United States (the latter is not a problem at all), that
AIDS represents a social crisis for this country rather than an ugly, dan-
gerous, but fairly easily controlled and only moderately expensive disease,
that the total amount of money we are spending on health care is ex-
cessive although the allocation among patients may be distorted, that the
shift of employment from manufacturing to services is a problem, that
the savings and loan debacle is anything more than the predictable har-
vest of foolish New Deal banking regulations, that the problem of drug
addiction is much more than an artifact of foolish efforts to solve it (like
the alcohol problem during Prohibition), that income and wealth are too
unequally distributed, that the American educational system taken as a
(Vol. 61:129
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AN EXAMPLE OF POSNER'S APPROACH: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION'
Posner develops his position on constitutional interpreta-
tion, like most of his positions in Overcoming Law, by respond-
ing to what he views as the unpragmatic arguments of others.
Posner's first victim is Herbert Wechsler. In his famous article
on "neutral principles,"36 Wechsler restated the question in
Brown v. Board of Education7 as one of freedom of associa-
tion. He asked whether there was a neutral principle that
would permit blacks to complain about being kept out of white
schools, but would forbid whites from complaining about going
to school with blacks. Because Wechsler could not find an ade-
quate principle, he objected to the Supreme Court's decision.s
Posner handily refutes Wechsler's traditional legal think-
ing
One might have supposed that the central question in Brown u.
Board of Education was not the scope of some abstract principle of
whole is either markedly inferior to the educational systems of the other
wealthy countries or starved for resources, or that our physical infra-
structure is disintegrating. I do not think we should regret the decline of
labor unions any more than we should regret the decline of those other
industrial dinosaurs, the Detroit automakers.
These assessments may be wrong. All I know for sure is that the
so-called problems that I have just mentioned present difficult analytical
and empirical issues that can no more be understood, let alone resolved,
by the intuitions and analytic procedures of persons schooled only in the
humanities than problems in high-energy physics or brain surgery can be
understood and resolved by close study of the Tractacus Logico-
Philosophicus.
POSNEIR supra note 1, at 455-56.
' While Posner's chapters on constitutional law are illustrative of his approach,
they only begin to scratch the surface of Ouercoming Law. Posner has written
memorable chapters comparing the legal profession to a Medieval guild and
arguing that the practice of law should be opened up to nonlaiyer; relating the
stories of Nazi judges and executive detention in wartime Britain; comparing
modem social conservatives to nineteenth century anti-liberal James Fitzjames
Stephen; excoriating Catherine Macinnon for not properly considering the costs
(heavy) and benefits (questionable) of her proposal to ban sexually explicit materi-
als; and exploring the relationships among rhetoric, legal reasoning, and science.
I Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Wechsler, supra note 36, at 34.
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freedom of association but whether racial segregation of public facili-
ties in the South was intended or likely to keep the blacks in their
traditionally subordinate position. This was a factual question, the
answer to which was obvious .... 39
Wechsler's concept of neutral principles meant "that judges
should avoid grounds of decision that would require them to
engage with the messy world of empirical reality-to inquire
for example into the motives and consequences of public school
segregation."0
Posner also criticizes the methodology of more recent
works, such as John Hart Ely's book, Democracy and Dis-
trust.41 Ely creates a unified theory to organize cases and ad-
vocate an outcome in future cases by adopting what Posner
calls a "top-down" approach to constitutional interpretation.42
From examining the Constitution and what the framers said
about it, Ely theorizes that the principal purpose of the Consti-
tution is to promote democratic values-especially the repre-
sentation of all citizens in the political process. Therefore, the
recognition of a new fundamental right is warranted only when
such a decision is "representation-reinforcing.' 3
Although Posner praises Ely's book as "a work of outstand-
ing merit," he criticizes it for not being "a masterpiece of social
science."' According to Posner, the main weakness of Democ-
racy and Distrust is that Ely ignores the political science and
economic literature on the effects of reapportionment, interest
groups, and public choice.45 For example, Ely applauds the
Supreme Court's reapportionment cases,46 but he does so
without taking note of the disagreement among political scien-
tists as to whether reapportionment has any effect on policy
outcomes.47 Ely finds affirmative action unproblematic be-
cause he views it as a matter of the white majority discrimi-
POSNER, supra note 1, at 72.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 74.
41 JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
POSNER, supra note 1, at 172, 198.
ELY, supra note 41, at 101-03.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 198, 206.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 205.
4' ELY, supra note 41, at 120-24.
4' POSNER, supra note 1, at 205.
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nating against itself,8 but he ignores the possibility that in-
terest groups can push through legislation that does not reflect
majority preferences. Ely disagrees with Griswold v. Con-
necticut" because he believes that the case had nothing to do
with representation," but Posner points out that the case
may have had everything to do with representation: an inter-
est group, consisting of the Catholic church and devout Catho-
lics, was blocking the repeal of an archaic law banning contra-
ceptives, a repeal which would have benefitted a group with a
weaker political voice-lower- and lower-middle-class women.
Understood pragmatically, Griswold may have been more
about overcoming representation-blocking inertia in the politi-
cal system than anything else 2
In sum, Posner criticizes the conceit that lawyers are espe-
cially equipped to analyze the issues of representation and
participation that Ely discusses. According to Posner, Ely
needs "more social science":
The effects of apportionment, the political dynamics of affirmative
action, the conditions for effective minority politics, the significance
of conflicting interests within a group, the force of inertia in the
political process-these and other matters central to the construc-
tion and evaluation of a participation-oriented representation-rein-
forcing jurisprudence are issues in social science. They are not is-
sues of "process" rather than "substance" in any sense relevant to
lawyers' capacities."'
Posner is also critical of two articles that disagree with the
result in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services.' In DeShaney, the Supreme Court held that al-
though the fourteenth amendment concept of liberty encom-
passes the right to be left alone by the state, it does not encom-
pass positive liberty, that is, the right to state services. There-
fore, a social worker's failure to protect an abused child was
ELY, supra note 41, at 170-72.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 203-04.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61 Ely does not state directly in Democracy and Distrust that he disagrees with
Griswold, but his disagreement directly follows from his criticism of the entire line
of privacy cases. See ELY, supra note 41, at 248 n.52.
2 POSNER, supra note 1, at 193-94, 204.
PoSNER, supra note 1, at 206-07.
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Posner
first discusses an article by David Strauss, who criticizes the
Supreme Court's distinction between negative and positive
liberty, action and inaction.56 According to Posner, Strauss is
not sufficiently empirical in several respects. First, Strauss
gives short shrift to the razor's edge upon which social workers
would have been placed had the Supreme Court decided the
case differently: social workers would have been subject to
liability both for depriving parents of their children and for not
doing so. Posner also accuses Strauss of slighting the existence
of state tort remedies against negligent child care workers.
Most importantly for Posner, Strauss does not consider the
possibility that the costs of increased litigation against welfare
agencies could lead to a curtailment of benefits. Posner notes
the existence of articles written by experts in public adminis-
tration and finance that analyze these issues and indicts
Strauss for not consulting this literature.57
Posner notes that an article by Akhil Amar and Daniel
Widawsky avoids one of the pitfalls of Strauss's argument but
Posner criticizes this article on other grounds." Whereas
Strauss's approach might lead to a rash of DeShaney-type
cases against police and fire departments, Amar and
Widawsky sidestep this whole issue by saying that the state's
failure to protect Joshua DeShaney violated the Thirteenth
Amendment. " Amar and Widawsky reach this startling con-
clusion by positing that the status of a battered child is equiva-
lent to that of a slave."0 Although Posner thinks this analysis
faulty on its own terms, he accepts, for the sake of argument,
that the Thirteenth Amendment could be interpreted as broad-
ly as Amar and Widawsky say.61 That still leaves the problem
of choosing between analogies: Is Joshua DeShaney closer to a
slave, or to a mugging victim who gets beat up while an inade-
Id. at 195-97.
David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs,
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 53, 56-57.
V POSNER, supra note 1, at 208-10.
' Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth
Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992).
I' d. at 1365; POSNER, supra note 1, at 209, 212.
o Amar & Widawsky, supra note 58, at 1363-65.
61 POSNER, supra note 1, at 211-13.
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quately trained police officer stands and watches? To Posner,
making the choice between these analogies requires consider-
ation of empirical factors, to which Amar and Widawsky, like
Strauss, have paid little attention.'
Posner also criticizes such leading scholars as Ronald
Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman." Enough, however, has al-
ready been said to convey the flavor of Posner's criticisms of
constitutional theorists. But before leaving this subject, it must
be noted that Posner spares no ammunition in shooting down
conservative "strict constructionists" such as Walter Berns'
and Robert Bork.66 Unlike the strict constructionists, Posner
has no doubt that judges necessarily act creatively in applying
old rules to new situations, and must be flexible in interpret-
ing broadly worded constitutional provisions. Indeed, Posner
favors the view that judges legislate "interstitially.'
Up to this point, all is well with Posner's analysis. Even a
lawyer who disagrees with the results Posner would reach in
particular cases cannot help but feel that he or she must be
ready to meet Posner with pragmatic and empirical
counterarguments. It becomes apparent, however, when Posner
sets forth his own method of constitutional interpretation that
the methods of those Posner criticizes may have more value
than he has conceded.
Posner begins by quoting with approval Justice Holmes's
statement that a law is constitutional unless it makes him
want to "puke.' Posner explains: "The point is only that our
deepest values.., live below thought and provide warrants for
action even when we cannot give those values a compelling or
perhaps any rational justification." 9 Thus he locates a basis
for judicial action in instinct; a judge can invalidate a law that
"he deeply feels to be terribly unjust, even if the conventional
62 POSNER, supra note 1, at 213.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 172-88.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 215-28.
POSNER, supra note , at 229-36.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 237-55.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 231-35.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 192 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Harold Laski (Oct. 23, 1926), in 2 HoLES-LASKI LLTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LAsIU 1916-1935, at 888 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed. 1953)).
1 POSNER, supra note 1, at 192.
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legal materials are not quite up to the job of constitutional
condemnation. " °
Posner anticipates that his reliance on instinct will be
criticized as subjective and unprincipled. His reply is that
reference to one's personal values is unavoidable, and that the
instinct of a pragmatic judge will be informed through empiri-
cal inquiry:
I may seem to be indulging in paradox in proposing an approach
that accepts the role of personal values in adjudication and asks
only that they be yoked to empirical data. But personal values,
while influenced by temperament and upbringing, are not indepen-
dent of adult personal experience. Research-into facts, not just
what judges have said in the past-can substitute for experience,
enlarge and correct the factual materials on which temperament and
outlook react, and thus bring home to a judge the realities of a law
against contraception or against abortion or against sodomy. 1
It is at this point that Posner appears to retreat from the
criticisms he has made of others. He states: "I am not against
judges stretching clauses-even such questionable candidates
as the due process clause-when there is a compelling practical
case or imperative felt need for intervention." He also notes:
"the responsible judge will not be content with a naked state-
ment of values. He will not ignore objections, or fail to test the
consistency of his values by exploring hypothetical cases within
the semantic domain of his statement."72
Therefore, if a judge is faced with a law that makes him
want to puke, but "the conventional legal materials are not
quite up to the job," he still has to find a rationale to justify
his value judgment and tie his decision into the Constitution.
It might be necessary to stretch a clause by resorting to the
sort of reasoning that Amar and Widawsky used. It might be
useful to test the semantic limits of one's newfound principle,
as Wechsler felt was essential. It might be beneficial to create
a unified theory to structure one's thinking, like Ely. It might
be appropriate to use all sorts of tools which are those of the
analytic philosopher, not the empiricist.
Posner surely understands these things. As noted above,
Posner admits that cases where there are disagreements on
'0 POSNER, supra note 1, at 192.
"1 POSNER, supra note 1, at 194-95.
72 POSNER, supra note 1, at 192.
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ends are difficult for his empirical methods to resolve; in those
cases one must "muddle through." Perhaps the only problem is
one of emphasis. While Posner's empirical tools remain ever-
useful in exploring the consequences of different courses of
action, the analytic methods he has criticized are, in the end,
just as necessary in the difficult cases as his empirical meth-
ods. So Ely and the others may not be so far off the mark after
all.
CONCLUSION
In Overcoming Law, Richard Posner pleads with the legal
community to stop addressing complex social issues solely by
manipulating legal concepts. Instead, lawyers should open
their eyes to the insights of modem science, and realize the
value of empirical data in analyzing the consequences of differ-
ent legal rules. While traditional legal reasoning will always
have its place, Posner's pragmatic jurisprudence clears up
much confusion caused by exclusive reliance on that reasoning.
As Posner states: "If it plants no trees, this pragmatic jurispru-
dence that I have been defending, at least it clears away a lot
of underbrush. It signals an attitude, an orientation, at times a
change in direction. That is something, and maybe a lot."73
POSNER, supra note 1, at 405.
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